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a return to a theory "that all transactions underlying claims in bankruptcy
would, in effect, be subject to federal review in the light of overriding
federal commercial law,"21 a concept already rejected in Erie v. Tompkins. 22
W. JOSEPH ENGLER, JR.
Guaranty—Partial Failure of Consideration in the Principal Contract—
Pro Tanto Defense for the Guarantor.—Walcutt v. Clevite Corfr. 1—
ln February of 1959, the plaintiffs sold their holdings in several corpora-
tions to the Clevite Corporation. They also agreed in separate assignable
writings not to compete with Clevite for a period of ten years, during which
time Clevite was to remunerate them in equal quarter-annual instalments.
In September, 1960, Clevite sold both the assets of the plaintiffs' former
corporations and the agreements not to compete to Walco Electronics Com-
pany. As part of the bargain, Walco promised Clevite that it would pay the
plaintiffs their regular instalments; moreover, Richmond, the president and
sole shareholder of Walco, guaranteed Clevite that he would pay if Walco
did not. The payments not forthcoming, the plaintiffs sued Clevite directly
on the noncompetition agreements. They also, as third party beneficiaries
of Richmond's guaranty to Clevite, sued Richmond. Walco was not served.
Richmond answered, inter alia, that Clevite had grossly exaggerated the
value of the assets sold to Walco, that Walco's agreement to pay the plain-
tiffs was thus obtained by fraud, and that because of such fraud on Walco,
he, Richmond, should be freed from his obligations as Walco's guarantor.
Special Term granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs against
both defendants, and to Clevite on its crossclaim against Richmond. Ap-
pellate Division affirmed. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals, in concluding
that the summary judgments against Richmond must be reversed, HELD:
First, that although Richmond's defense of fraud upon Walco was unavail-
ing as a matter of law, nevertheless, sufficient facts had been pleaded to
support a pro tanto defense which had not been pressed, namely partial fail-
ure of consideration in the Walco-Clevite contract; and second, that since
Richmond and Walco were "truly one and the same," that Richmond should
be deemed to have had the implied consent of Walco to assert against the
plaintiffs Walco's claim of fraud against Clevite.
In New York, it has long been the rule that a surety 2 when sued alone
cannot defend by showing that his principal was defrauded by the creditor
21 Hill, supra note 6, at 1013.
22 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
1 13 N.Y.2d 48, 191 N.E.2d 894 (1963).
2 Richmond is in fact a guarantor and not a surety as strictly defined. Accord-
ingly, his obligation is secondary, that is, conditioned upon the default of Walco.
Nevertheless, since the term surety is often broadly used to indicate any responsibility
for the debt of another and since the legal consequences in the instant case are the
same whether Richmond is a surety or guarantor, this writer has chosen for the sake of
simplicity and clarity of expression to use the term surety even when technically incorrect.




in entering into the principal contract. 3 The fraud is thought to give rise
to a cause of action personal to the principal; and were the surety allowed
to assert this personal claim without the principal's consent, then, it is
reasoned, the cause of action would be merged in the judgment and the
principal would be deprived of his independent right to affirm or disaffirm
the contract" Thus, in Walcutt, if Richmond were allowed to plead Clevite's
fraud upon Walco as a counterclaim to the action by the plaintiffs, then
Walco would later be unable either to rescind its contract with Clevite or
sue Clevite for fraud.
The inability of the surety to plead the creditor's fraud upon the
principal does not, of course, prevent him from pleading the creditor's fraud
upon himself.5 In this respect, it is well established that the creditor's con-
cealment from the surety of facts materially increasing the risk of the
principal's nonperformance (and of the surety's consequent liability) con-
stitutes a fraud upon the surety" Thus, it has been held that the failure
of an insurance company to reveal to the bondsman on its bank deposit
that the depositary bank was insolvent at the time the bond was given
constitutes a fraud upon the bondsman? Simpson, in this context, has sug-
gested that the concealment by the coeditor of his fraud upon the principal
is the concealment of a material fact within the rule just stated, and is thus
a fraud upon the surety; 8 but his contention appears never to have been
accepted in New York, and has been rejected in at least one New York
case, Taylor-Fichter Steel Const. Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co.°
Not only is the surety barred from showing the creditor's fraud upon
the principal, he is in fact prohibited from interposing any cause of action
which is personal to the principal. Further, it does not matter whether the
cause of action is intimately related to the contract binding his principal'
to the creditor or not. Thus, he cannot defend upon the ground that the
a Ettlinger v. National Sur. Co., 221 N.Y. 467, 117 N.E. 945 (1917), noted, 31
Harv. L. Rev. 898 (1918), annot., 3 A.L.R. 865 (1919) ; Elliott v. Brady, 192 N.Y.
221, 85 N.E. 69 (1908); Grill v. Driad Constr. Co., 34 N.Y.S.2d 593 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
Cf. Fluker v. Henry's Adm'r, 27 Ala. 403 (1855); Brown v. Wright, 23 Ky. (7
T.B. Mon.) 396 (1828); Walker v. Gilbert, 8 Miss. (7 S.&M.) 456 (1846). Contra,
Collett v. Wise, 62 Ind. 451 (1878); Bryant v. Crosby, 36 Me. 562, (1853); Putnam
v. Schuyler, 4 N.Y. (Hun) 166 (Sup. Ct. 1875); Restatement, Security § 118 (1941).
See also, Simpson, Suretyship ,§ 56 (1950). Stearns, Suretyship 7.6 (5th ed. Elder
1951); Note, Defenses of a Principal Available to a Surety, 27 Iowa L. Rev. 601 (1942);
Note, Fraud and Duress as Defenses to the Surety, 40 Colum, L. Rev. 1226 (1930);
Annot. 3 A.L.R. 865 (1919).
4 Ettlinger v. National Sur. Co., supra note 3.
5 Elliott v. Brady, supra note 3. See also Simpson, Suretyship § 28 (1950); Stearns,
Suretyship § 2.11 (1951). Richmond argued on appeal that he himself had been de-
frauded, but his failure to raise the issue below was held to preclude its being brought
to the court's attention for the first time on appeal.
First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Sherman's Estate, 250 App. Div. 339, 294
N.Y. Supp. 131 (1937); Howe Mach. Co. v. Farrington, 82 N.Y. 121 (1880).
7 Phillips v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 200 App. Div. 208, 193 N.Y. Supp.
467 (1922).
8 Simpson, Suretyship § 56 (1950).
9 258 App. Div. 235, 16 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1939).
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creditor has breached the main contract, 1 ° or a warranty incident to it,"
nor can he defend with a claim completely unconnected with the suretyship
relation. 1 ' He may, however, plead the creditor's duress upon the principal
since, by so doing, he would not be defending with a cause of action personal
to his principal.' 3
The more influential commentators have been uniformly unimpressed
with the aforementioned view, at least to the degree that the New York
courts, in asserting it, have assumed that certain acts of the creditor can-
not at the same time give rise to both a cause of action in favor of the
principal and a complete defense in favor of the surety. Thus Stearns, in
his Law of Suretyship, while not denying that a claim exists on behalf of the
principal in the event of the creditor's fraud, nonetheless argues that "on
principle" the surety should not be liable to the creditor; 14 Arant maintains
that the creditor's breach of warranty or contract produces a risk of non-
performance on the part of the principal which the surety should not be
required to bear; 15 and Simpson, as noted above, asserts that "the creditor's
concealment from the surety of his conduct by which he has made per-
formance by the principal less likely . . . is undoubtedly fraud upon the
surety." 10 Lesser lights, many of theni nameless, have taken similar stands
in comments and casenotes."
In Walcutt, the Court of Appeals has in its own way answered the
critics. It has retained, to be sure, the time-honored rule prohibiting the
surety from pleading in bar a cause of action belonging to his principal;
but it has considerably mitigated the oppressive effect of this rule by per-
mitting the surety to defend pro tanto on the ground of partial failure of
consideration in the main contract. In extending this defense to the surety,
the court has radically departed from a line of decisions which have refused
to acknowledge the existence of such a defense when the failure was al-
legedly based on an act of the creditor sufficiently prejudicial to the princi-
pal to give rise to a cause of action. In Gillespie v. Torrance,18 for example,
10 Standard Factors Corp. v. Kreisler, 53 N.Y.S.2d 871, aff'd, 269 App. Div. 830,
56 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1945); City of New York v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 253 App. Div.
676, 3 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1938); New Jersey Button Works v. Silverstein, 173 Misc. 1072,
19 N.Y.S.2d 610 (Munic. Ct. New York 1940).
It Gillespie v. Torrance, 25 N.Y. 306 (1862); Werner v. Boochever, 162 N.Y.
Supp. 297 (Sup. Ct. 1916); Veriscope Co. v. Brady, 77 N.Y. Supp. 159 (New York
City Ct. 1902). See also, Arant, supra note 3; reply, Levine, The Principal's Warranty
and Offset Claims Against a Creditor as Defenses to the Surety, 30 Mich. L. Rev. 197
(1931).
12 Nye Schneider Fowler Co. v. Barnes, 179 App. Div. 239, 166 N.Y. Supp. 461
(1917) ; East River Bank v. Rogers, 20 N.Y. Super. Ct. (7 Bosw.) 493 (1860). Accord,
Meeker v. Halsey, 87 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1937).
13 Osborn v. Robbins, 36 N.Y. 365 (1867) ; Strong v. Grannis, 26 Barb. (N.Y.)
122 (Sup. Ct. 1857). Cf. Colon & Co. v. East 189th St. Bldg. & Constr. Co., 141 App.
Div. 441, 126 N.Y. Supp. 226 (1910). Accord, Bank of Clinchburg v. Carter, 101 W.
Va. 611, 133 S.E. 370 (1926), noted 21 III. L. Rev. 637 (1927).
14 Stearns, Suretyship § 2.11 (5th ed. Elder 1951).
15 Arant, op. cit. supra note 3.
16 Simpson, op. cit. supra note 8.
17 See, e.g., 13 Colum. L. Rev. 426 (1913); 27 Yale L.J. 566 (1918).
18 Supra note 11.
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the defendant was surety on a note given to the creditor in return for logs
allegedly subject to an implied warranty of quality. When the creditor sued
the surety on the note, the surety raised the defense of partial failure of con-
sideration, making it clear by his allegations that he intended to prove this
failure by showing that the logs were not as warranted. The Court of Ap-
peals rejected this "ingenious" plea, and held that the real defense was
breach of warranty, a defense personal to the principal and unavailable to
the surety. Were the surety allowed to recoup on the ground of breach of
warranty, it was stated, then a large claim of the principal might be barred
in cancelling a small one of the creditor." To the same effect is Lasher v.
Williamson,20 a case in which the plaintiff leased to one Gibbs certain
premises upon which he (the plaintiff) agreed to store a certain quantity of
goods at a fixed price. In an action for the rent, it was held that Gibbs'
surety could not present evidence tending to show that the plaintiffs had
only partially fulfilled his storage promise. Said the court, "The nonper-
formance or partial performance of Lasher's engagement to Gibbs is not to
be regarded as a failure of consideration, but as an independent cause of
action, which Gibbs, and he only, may assert." 2 ' So also in Segar, Inc. v.
1967-1975 Ocean Ave. Realty Corp., 22 it was held that the creditor's "im-
proper and unworkmanlike performance" did not, so far as the surety was
concerned, give rise to the defense of partial failure of consideration . 22
Had the court in Walcutt been satisfied with this earlier view it might
still have reversed, but on the single ground that Richmond had Walco's
implied consent to use Walco's personal claim in his own defense. This, how-
ever, it refused to do, choosing to read Richmond's answer in a liberal fashion
so as to create, as it were, a defense it thought wise to sustain. While it is
here submitted that the holding in the instant case is a step in the right
direction, it should be noted that Arant, Simpson and others 24 would give the
19 Putnam v. Schuyler, supra note 3, at 170, distinguishes Gillespie and in a
sense foreshadows the holding in the instant case. In Putnam, it was said:
A guarantor cannot set up, by way of set-off, a claim distinct from that on
which he is sued. The right of set-off (that is, as distinguished from a de-
fense arising upon the claim itself) belongs only to the principal debtor, and
can be used only at his option. Such is the doctrine of Gillespie v. Torrance,
and this is all which that' case decides on this point. By indirection, however,
it implies that a defense to the claim (as distinguished from a set -off), is
available to the guarantor.
29 55 N.Y. 619 (1874).
21 Id. at 620.
22 127 Misc. 805, 217 N.Y. Supp. 471 (Sup. Ct. 1926), noted 26 Colum. L. Rev.
1035 (1926).
23 A few cases in New York have taken a contrary view and, prior to the in-
stant case, have extended a pro tanto defense to the surety on the basis of partial
failure of consideration in the main contract. Unlike the instant case, however, the
extent of the failure has in these cases been readily ascertainable. Thus, in Sawyer v.
Chambers, 43 Barb. (N.Y.) 622 (Sup. Ct. 1864), a case remarkably similar to Lasher
v. Williamson, supra note 20, the defendant surety was granted the right to present
evidence tending to show that only a part of the goods for which the note was given
had been delivered; and in Forsythe v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 130 Misc.
569, 224 N.Y. Supp. 330 (Sup. Ct. 1927), a like result was reached on similar facts.
24 See notes 14-17 supra.
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surety a complete defense when the creditor acts in such a way as to create
an undue risk that the principal will not perform, whereas under the partial
failure interpretation, the defense being pro tanto, the surety in many cases
will still have to respond to the creditor when, perhaps in good sense, this
should not be required.
STUART L. POTTER
Insurance—Cooperation Clause—Waiver of Breach Extending to All
Claims.—Mayflower Ins. Co. v. Osborne.'—This is an action for de-
claratory judgment by the insurer to determine its liability under an auto-
mobile insurance policy in relation to three Tennessee state court judgments
rendered against it. The policy in question was issued, under the laws of
Virginia, to Alice Roe Osborne as the named insured and owner of the
automobile. The insured and her daughter were injured in a collision in
Kentucky while passengers in the car which was being driven by the named
insured's husband with her consent. The driver of the other car was also in-
jured. By a pre-arranged agreement with attorneys representing Alice Roe
Osborne and the daughter, the husband submitted himself to the jurisdiction
of the courts of Tennessee. Since the accident occurred in Kentucky, and
the Osbornes resided in Virginia, this was the only way jurisdiction could
have been obtained in Tennessee. Immediately upon learning of this collusive
service, the insurer brought the present action alleging that the submission to
service of process was a breach of the policy's cooperation clause. 2 Subse-
quently, the insurer requested and secured the Osbornes' full cooperation in
defending suits brought by the other driver in Kentucky. The insurer still
claims the breach as a defense to the Tennessee judgments. HELD: The co-
operation of the insured was a condition precedent to any liability on the
part of the insurer, and a failure of the condition completely voided the
insurance contract. However, by seeking and receiving the cooperation in the
defense of the suit brought in Kentucky, the insurer waived its rights to
assert the breach as a defense in any action resulting from the accident.
Provisions for the cooperation of the insured with the insurer in settling
or litigating claims arising under the policy have universally been held
effective and enforceable, and are generally considered a material part of the
insurance contract.3
 The purpose of such a clause is to prevent collusion
between the insured and the injured party to the detriment of the insurer'
1 216 F. Supp. 127 (W.D. Va. 1963).
2 The policy contained a standard cooperation clause:
The insured shall cooperate with the company and, upon the company's request,
attend hearings and trials and assist in making settlements, securing and giving
evidence, obtaining the attendance of witnesses and in the conduct of any legal
proceeding in connection with the subject matter of this insurance.
Supra note 1, at 129, n.l.
3 Potomac Ins. Co. v. Stanley, 281 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1960); Tillman v. Great Am.
Indem. Co., 207 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1953); Horton v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 179
Tenn. 526, 164 S.W.2d 1016 (1942).
4 E.g., American Auto. Ins. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 159 Md. 631, 152 Atl. 523 (1930).
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